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Abstract. The macroeconomic policies of states can produce significant costs and benefits for 
other states, yet international macroeconomic cooperation has been one of the weakest 
areas of international law. We ask why states have had such trouble cooperating over 
macroeconomic issues, when they have been relatively successful at cooperation over other 
economic matters such as international trade. We argue that although the theoretical 
benefits of macroeconomic cooperation are real, in practice it is difficult to sustain because 
optimal cooperative policies are often uncertain and time variant, making it exceedingly 
difficult to craft clear rules for cooperation in many areas. It is also often difficult or 
impossible to design credible self-enforcement mechanisms. Recent cooperation on bank 
capital standards, the history of exchange rate cooperation, the European monetary union, 
and the prospects for broader monetary and fiscal cooperation are all discussed. We contrast 





Recent events highlight a range of issues raised by uncoordinated national 
macroeconomic policies. The financial crisis of 2008 can be blamed in part on the 
failure of the Basel agreements to prevent banks in different countries from taking 
on excessive risk. The Basel agreements, which imposed uniform capital adequacy 
regulations on banks in different countries, were thought necessary to prevent 
national regulation from driving banks overseas, but countries failed to develop and 
implement sufficiently strict international rules. Then in the midst of the financial 
crisis, central banks attempted to coordinate their rescues and even interest rate 
cuts. Because large banks conduct operations across borders, a central bank that 
rescues one bank may end up helping depositors who live in foreign countries, but 
central banks will be tempted to undersupply such a public good unless they can 
cooperate with each other. Reports suggest that cooperation was at best ad hoc and 
incomplete. Finally, the Eurozone crisis has demonstrated anew what happens when 
governments fail to coordinate their macroeconomic policies. Here, the failure of 
European governments and institutions to prevent Greece from borrowing too 
much, and then their difficulty in coordinating a response to the sovereign debt 
crisis in Greece and other periphery countries, helped cause and sustain the 
financial crisis in Europe and plunged much of the continent into a deep recession. 
                                                        
1 Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School; James & Patricia Kowal Professor of 
Law, Stanford Law School. We thank an audience at University College London for comments, and 
Ellie Norton and Randall Zack for research assistance. 
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These dramatic events from the last few years are only the latest 
manifestations of the limits of international macroeconomic cooperation. Countries 
have tried for decades to control fluctuations in exchange rates in the hope of 
reducing exchange rate risk faced by firms and stimulating international trade. 
While there have been some limited successes, countries have failed to find a lasting 
solution. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the gold standard 
limited currency fluctuations among major trading nations, but the countries left the 
gold standard during the Great Depression.2 After World War II, western countries 
established the Bretton Wood system to manage exchange rates, but that system 
collapsed in 1973.3 Since then, episodic attempts at ad hoc cooperation to address 
exchange rates have largely failed.4 Monetary union in Europe was the most 
ambitious effort, but is now in disarray. 
 
The failures and partial failures of international macroeconomic cooperation 
can be contrasted with a major success in international law in a closely related field: 
international trade. Leaders at the end of World War II saw cooperation over 
exchange rates and cooperation over trade as parallel elements in a strategy of 
rebuilding and integrating the west. In the case of trade, countries built the GATT 
system and then developed it further into the WTO, a sophisticated institution for 
coordinating trade policy and resolving disputes. Over several decades, the 
members of GATT and the WTO successfully eliminated many major trade barriers, 
including tariffs on goods. International trade boomed. Yet the Bretton Woods 
system, which also featured a major international institution in the International 
Monetary Fund, sputtered out in a few decades. And other forms of macroeconomic 
cooperation never got off the ground outside Europe. 
 
In this paper, we ask a simple question: why has international cooperation on 
macroeconomic matters been so much less successful than cooperation on 
international trade? The answer is not obvious. Lowering trade barriers, controlling 
currency movements, regulating banks, and the like, are all aspects of modern 
economic regulation, and there is no a priori reason why the first should be easier 
than the others.  
 
                                                        
2 See Barry Eichengreen, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION, 1919-1939, 4-
26 (1992) (explaining why the gold standard succeeded and its eventual abandonment).  
3 See Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld & Marc J. Melitz, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 518, 526-27 (9th 
ed. 2012) (outlining the rise and fall of the Bretton Wood system). 
4 See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING & FINANCIAL MARKETS, 542-43 (2d ed. 
2010) (describing the European Monetary System). 
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Our answer is based on the relationship between these goals and the nature 
of the decentralized cooperation that prevails among states. First, there is a great 
deal more academic consensus on the benefits of lowering trade barriers than on 
the benefits of the other activities. Second, the lowering of trade barriers lends itself 
to rule-based cooperation, while the other forms of cooperation cannot be easily 
reduced to simple rules. Rule-based cooperation is easier to maintain than 
cooperation that requires more fluid forms of behavior. Third, international trade 
cooperation is more amenable to self-enforcement than cooperation on 
macroeconomic issues. 
 
I. Economic Foundations of International Legal Cooperation 
 
 In line with earlier work, we examine the topic of international 
macroeconomic cooperation from a rational choice perspective, in which we assume 
that states have well-defined interests and engage in cooperation to the extent that 
they can advance those interests and to the extent that cooperation can be made 
self-enforcing. International law is thus endogenous to the interests of the states 
rather than an exogenous force that compels states to act contrary to their 
interests.5 
 
 A state’s interest is, of course, derived from the interests of its component 
parts—citizens, interest groups, government institutions, and so forth. Some 
combination of these interests, we assume, will define the state’s conception of the 
“social welfare,” and thus the objectives that the state pursues in any given policy 
area. Economists sometimes posit, for example, that states maximize aggregate 
national economic welfare, which corresponds roughly to the maximization of 
national income.6 By this metric, the well-being of all producer and consumer 
interests affected by economic activity “counts” equally for policymakers. It is also 
common to suppose that states maximize a “political” welfare function in which 
various groups have different degrees of influence.7 The differences in influence can 
result because some groups are well-organized politically and others are not, or 
because particular groups are viewed as particularly deserving of state assistance 
(the poor, for example). In still other contexts, states may be imagined to pursue a 
welfare goal defined in relation to some subsidiary policy goal(s), such as a loss 
function embodying an inflation target and an output target.8  
                                                        
5 For our most recent statement of our approach, see Eric A. Posner & Alan Sykes, ECONOMIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harvard, forthcoming 2013). 
6 See, e.g., Harry G. Johnson, Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation, 21 REV. ECON. STUD. 142 (1953). 
7 See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833 (1994); 
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 215 (1999). 
8 See, e.g., Olivier Jean Blanchard & Stanley Fischer, LECTURES ON MACROECONOMICS 567-69 (1989). 
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 Whatever the welfare objective, it is a commonplace in the academic 
literature, and seemingly quite realistic in practice, to assume that states pursue the 
interests of their own citizens without as much (if any) regard for the well-being of 
foreigners. Opportunities for international cooperation – and thus for international 
law – thereby arise if the policies pursued by states acting unilaterally have positive 
and negative consequences for other states (externalities). When some activity or 
policy imposes negative externalities on other states (for example, cross-border 
pollution), states acting unilaterally will tend to engage in too much of the activity, 
and states can benefit by agreeing to abate the negative externality. When an 
activity or policy imposes positive externalities on other states (such as 
conservation of biodiversity), states acting unilaterally will tend to engage in too 
little of the activity, and can benefit by agreeing to increase it.9 
 
 Cooperation can arise in different ways. The most straightforward is through 
formal treaties among the affected states. In other areas, states may informally 
converge on customary behavior that reflects a useful form of cooperation 
(customary international law). In still other situations, informal promises and 
handshakes among public officials may be all that is necessary (soft law).10 As we 
proceed through the issues in this paper, we will see that each type of “law” has 
played some role in the macroeconomic arena. 
 
 For cooperation of any sort to emerge, however, all cooperating states must 
benefit from it. The requirement that states be better off by cooperating rather than 
by opting out and pursuing their best unilateral alternative may be termed the 
“participation constraint.”11 
 
 In addition, international cooperation is possible only when it is “self-
enforcing.” International law has no third party enforcer akin to a court or sheriff 
with the ability to seize assets or lock up violators. With rare exceptions, the failure 
of a state to abide by international law is not punished or sanctioned by force. 
Instead, cooperation is almost always sustained by mutual threats of defection from 
the regime (or another, linked regime) – an implicit threat that if one state cheats, 
others will do the same and the benefits of cooperation will be lost.12 
 
                                                        
9 Posner & Sykes, supra at __. 
10 For a lengthy treatment of the role of soft-law in international financial regulation, see Chris 
Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2012). 
11 See Posner & Sykes, supra at _. 
12 See id. at _. 
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 For cooperation to be sustainable through such self-enforcement strategies, 
each country must gain more, at each point in time, by continuing to cooperate than 
by “cheating.” Cooperation is thus easier when the long-term benefits of cooperation 
are greater and the short-term gains from cheating are smaller. Related, cooperation 
is easier when states value the future relatively highly (they have a low “discount 
rate”). It is also easier when cheating is easily detected and the rules governing 
cooperation are clear, and harder when the rules are vague or complex and cheating 
may be harder to identify. Finally, cooperation may become unstable because of 
“shocks” – changes in circumstances that increase the returns to short term cheating 
or reduce the benefits of long term cooperation. 13 We will have much more to say 
about such matters in later sections. 
 




 The World Trade Organization (WTO), successor to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has 155 members at this writing.14 Since the formation 
of GATT in 1947, international trade in goods and services has exploded, growing 
considerably more rapidly than global output. From 1948 to 1998, trade in goods 
increased by 6 percent per year in real terms, while global output increased by 3.9 
percent per year.15 This growth of international commerce is widely attributable to 
a reduction in barriers to international trade pursuant to the GATT/WTO system.16 
Average tariff rates on dutiable imports have declined in developed countries, for 
example, from an average of 40% or so at the founding of GATT to 5% or less 
today.17 Over the same period, the membership of WTO/GATT has grown steadily, 
as have the scope of the legal commitments undertaken by its members. 
 
 With a few minor bumps in the road, the liberalization of trade since the 
founding of GATT has steadily increased, with each successive negotiating “round” 
bringing about further tariff cuts and additional liberalization commitments on 
                                                        
13 See id. at _. 
14 See Members and Observers, WTO, (May 10, 2012),  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
15 Growth, jobs, development and better international relations, WTO,  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/book_e/stak_e_3.htm. 
16 One scholar attempted to show statistically that the law did not in fact cause the reduction in trade 
barriers, which occurred independently. See Andrew Rose, Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases 
Trade?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 98 (2004). However, his empirical method has been persuasively debunked; 
see Judith Goldstein, Michael Rivers & Michael Tomz, Comment, Do We Really Know that the WTO 
Increases Trade, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 2005 (2007). 
17 See John H. Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan O. Sykes, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 5-6 (5th 
ed. 2008). 
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matters such as non-tariff barriers and trade in services. By contrast, the era prior to 
GATT was characterized by waves of protectionism, such as the Smoot Hawley Tariff 
of 1930 in the United States, which substantially raised U.S. tariffs and precipitated a 
round of stiff retaliatory increases abroad.18 
 
 By almost any account, therefore, multilateral cooperation on international 
trade since the founding of GATT has been remarkably successful.19 In this section, 
we detail the basic logic of its economic structure, and suggest why international 
trade is an issue area that is particularly suited to stable international cooperation. 
It will serve as a nice contrast to the macroeconomic policy areas that we discuss in 
later sections. 
 
B. The Gains from Cooperation on Trade Policy 
 
 The economic structure of international trade agreements has received a 
great deal of attention from prominent international economists. The seminal early 
paper was written by the Chicago economist Harry Johnson, who considered the 
strategic interaction between two countries, each large enough to influence the 
prices foreign exporters receive for their exports (the “large country” assumption).20 
Johnson posited that each nation maximized its national income, and observed that 
large countries could enhance their national incomes by imposing positive tariffs, 
taking the behavior of the other nation to be fixed (the “Nash equilibrium” 
assumption). The reason is that in response to a tariff increase, foreign exporters 
will cut their prices somewhat as demand for their exports weakens. Thus, 
foreigners absorb part of the tariff, and the tariff revenue thus arises in part at the 
expense of foreigners, who do not “count” in the national income calculus, and 
whose income loss is thus ignored by a national income maximizing government. 
Johnson proved that in Nash equilibrium, each nation would charge a positive, 
“optimal tariff.” Another way to understand Johnson’s result is that the consumers 
of any large country collectively have a degree of “monopsony” power over the price 
                                                        
18 Id. See Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 516-517 (explaining the Smooth Hawley Tariff 
of 1930 and subsequent national protectionism). 
19 Whether global cooperation can achieve further liberalization, however, is unclear. In recent years, 
much of the negotiating action has shifted into various preferential trading arrangements such as 
free trade areas, which are permitted under GATT Article XXIV. And, as of this writing, protectionist 
sentiment and actions by countries seem to be gaining ground. See e.g., IMF’s Lagarde Urges Caution 
Over Protectionism,CHI. TRIB., July 9, 2012, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-
09/business/sns-rt-us-indonesia-lagardebre86903f-20120709_1_imf-s-lagarde-protectionism-
caution; Pascal Lamy, Lamy Cautions over Protectionism, WTO (May 2012), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl232_e.htm. 
20 See Johnson, supra note _. 
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of imports. The consumers may be unable to organize privately to exploit this 
monopsony power, but their government can do so through the use of tariffs.  
 
 Johnson further noted, however, that global income declines as a result of 
such tariffs (free trade maximizes global income and the exploitation of monopsony 
power reduces global income). Accordingly, in Johnson’s model, the two countries 
could both benefit from an agreement to eschew tariffs, following which they might 
split the increase in global income in such a way as to make each better off than 
before.21 
 
 More modern theorists have built upon Johnson’s insight, while questioning 
his assumption of national income maximization. Among other things, if 
governments were all national income maximizers, then trade agreements would 
provide for free trade, which they do not.22 Thus, more recent work on trade 
agreements commonly posits that governments maximize a welfare function that 
includes “political economy” weights, whereby the incomes of certain groups are 
given more weight in the welfare calculus.23 Certain industries and unions may be 
well-organized and influential politically, for example, while other industries and 
consumers may be poorly organized and less influential. Trade agreements 
negotiated under these circumstances may well retain pockets of tariffs and other 
forms of protection from foreign competition.  
 
 Nevertheless, the modern political economy theories retain an essential 
insight of Johnson’s work – “large” nations acting unilaterally will ignore the harm 
imposed on foreign exporters by trade policies that restrict imports and thus reduce 
the prices received by foreign exporters. This externality is ubiquitous and results 
from the trade policy actions of any large nation. Because the externality is negative, 
theory predicts that nations acting unilaterally will be excessively protectionist. 
International cooperation to liberalize trade is valuable, therefore, and international 
cooperation through trade agreements will systematically lead to greater 
liberalization, precisely as we observe in practice.  
 
C. Self-Enforcement in Trade Agreements 
 
 Negotiations under WTO/GATT auspices involve the exchange of reciprocal 
tariff concessions. Nations approach each other regarding the markets in which 
                                                        
21 If the countries were asymmetric in size, however, side payments might be required to secure the 
participation of the larger country. See id. at __. 
22 This proposition assumes the availability of any necessary side payments among asymmetric 
countries. See id. at _. 
23 See Grossman & Helpman, supra note _; Bagwell & Staiger, supra note _. 
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their exporters would like to secure better access. Country A will agree to liberalize 
its market for, say, computers, in return for a reciprocal concession on, say, textiles. 
Negotiations in practice cover thousands of products (and now service sectors as 
well under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)24).  
 
 As a result of this exchange of concessions, and because of the participation 
constraint, all of the “large” countries (think of large countries as the countries 
about whose trade policies other nations care) will both give and receive trade 
policy concessions. These concessions matter importantly to their own exporters 
(concessions received) and to foreign exporters (concessions given). This fact 
immediately suggests the possibility of a self-enforcing regime: should country A 
cheat on a concession that matters to country B, country B will respond by cheating 
on a concession that matters to country A.  
 
 In the simple two-country, two good models popular with economists, only 
one concession runs in each direction, and each country can adopt the simple 
strategy of retracting its concession in response to cheating by the other. Because 
cooperation is jointly valuable, this outcome hurts both countries, and thus 
cooperation is sustainable unless the short-term gains from cheating become too 
great, perhaps in response to some political shock.25 
 
 In the real world context with dozens of countries and thousands of goods, 
the basic logic of self-enforcement remains the same – cheating by one country 
causes it to lose valuable concessions made to it by others. In fact, the large number 
of concessions in the WTO/GATT system tends to support sustained cooperation, 
because even if a nation is tempted to cheat on one or two of them, it typically does 
not want the system to unravel altogether. All nations thus have an interest in 
cabining disputes to protect the broader gains from cooperation on vast numbers of 
other matters. 
 
 The WTO dispute settlement system helps to orchestrate cooperation.26 It 
has an arbitration-like procedure to identify violations, and to calibrate the 
allowable retaliation in response to any proven violation. The system also has the 
capacity to resolve disputes over the meaning of the rules, so that disagreements 
                                                        
24 See Services Trade, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm. 
25 See Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM ch. 6 (2002). 
26 For empirical analysis of this institution that suggests that it is fairly effective, see Marc L. Busch & 
Eric Reinhart, Trade Brief on The WTO Dispute Settlement (2004), 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/mlb66/SIDA.pdf; Chad P. Bown, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE 
(2009). 
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over ambiguous legal obligations do not degenerate into trade wars. But the basic 
structure is as theory would predict – when a cheater is identified and refuses to 
cure misconduct, aggrieved nations can suspend commensurate concession made to 
the cheater in retaliation.27 The stability and growth of WTO/GATT membership, 
and the success of the institution in bringing down global trade barriers, is a 
testament to the success of this self-enforcing structure. 
 
 Other features of the international trade regime have also contributed to the 
success of cooperation. Trade barriers are in large measure fairly transparent –
exporters know if they have to pay a tariff to get their goods across a foreign border, 
and what the amount is. They can tell when a quota is keeping their goods out of a 
potential market. One can also write tariff commitments in simple and clear terms – 
the tariff on widgets shall not exceed 10% of their value, for example.  Finally, the 
WTO/GATT system includes some explicit mechanisms to adjust the bargain in 
response to shocks. Explicit authority for tariff renegotiation is contained in GATT 
Article XXVIII, for example, and nations may deviate temporarily from tariff 
commitments if an importing industry is suffering serious injury due to an import 
surge under GATT Article XIX.28 Such rules create “pressure valves” that allow 
strong political demands for deviation from commitments to be addressed without 
causing cooperation to unravel across the board. 
 
 The discussion above has emphasized cooperation under WTO/GATT 
auspices, but of course dozens of other international trade agreements also operate 
successfully in accordance with similar logic. The United States alone now has a 
dozen or so free-trade agreements with various nations, the most important being 
NAFTA. Negotiations toward a larger Trans-Pacific Partnership are now in progress. 
Almost all other nations also belong to various preferential trading arrangements.  
 
 An important dimension of international cooperation under the Articles of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is also driven by the gains from international 
cooperation on trade. Pursuant to IMF Article VIII(2)(a), members are not permitted 
(without permission of the Fund) to impose restrictions on the conversion of 
domestic to foreign currency when needed to finance “current account” 
transactions, that is, transactions in goods and services (as opposed to capital 
transactions such as real estate or stock investments).29 This provision was also a 
                                                        
27 See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute 
Settlement in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179 (2002). 
28 Id. Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" 
with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991). 
29 See Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 300-01. 
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response to pre-GATT practices by many nations. For example, prior to the creation 
of the IMF, some nations established multiple exchange rate systems that required 
domestic currency to be purchased at inflated rates for certain trade transactions, 
mimicking the effect of a tariff.30 By ending such practices, IMF Article VIII facilitates 
trade cooperation by increasing the transparency of trade barriers and making 
commitments under WTO/GATT auspices more credible.31 This feature of the IMF 
system has proven quite successful and robust over time, even as other aspects of 
IMF cooperation on exchange rates has failed (as we discuss below). 
 




 The financial crisis that began in 2007 has had a devastating effect on the 
economies of many major countries. Global GDP fell by 1.9 percent in real terms in 
2009, after having grown by three percent annually over the previous nine years.32 
In the United States, the unemployment rate reached 10.1 percent in 2009, while in 
the European Union it reached 9.7 percent in 2010.33 The recovery has also been 
anemic. The U.S. economy is expected to grow by only 2 percent in 2012, while 
Europe has fallen back into recession, in large part because of the sovereign debt 
crisis.34 
 
 Economists generally agree that the severe downturn was precipitated by 
the failure or potential failure of important financial institutions, and the resulting 
tightness (and feared future tightness) in credit markets. The root cause was a 
dramatic reduction in the value of certain assets held by major banks and other 
financial institutions, largely in the form of mortgage-backed securities. During the 
housing market bubble in the United States, many lenders issued mortgages to 
questionable borrowers whose ability to repay was suspect, often under adjustable 
rate contracts with unaffordable future payments. They did so in part with the (ex 
                                                        
30 To a degree, these practices continued after the formation of the IMF and were a source of 
numerous disputes. See Kenneth W. Dam, THE RULES OF THE GAME 131-32 (1982). 
31 IMF Art. VIII. 
32 Tatiana Didier et al, How Resilient Were Emerging Economies to the Global Crisis (World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 5637), SANTA CRUZ INST. INT’L ECON., (April 
2011),sciie.ucsc.edu/JIMF4/WPS5637_Schmukler.pdf. Further data is available at Tracking the Global 
Financial Crisis: An Analysis of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, BROOK., (May 2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/05_financial_crisis_linn.aspx. 
33 Suzanne Casaux & Alessandro Turrini, Post-Crisis Unemployment Developments: US and EU 
Approaching?, EUR. COMM’N, (ECFIN Economic Brief, Issue 13, May 2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_briefs/2011/pdf/eb13_en.pdf. 
34 Edward P. Lazear, The Worst Economic Recovery in History, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577311470997904292.html. 
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post inaccurate) expectation that housing prices would continue to rise, and that 
borrowers could simply refinance and use home equity to cover their obligations. In 
addition, the lenders knew that they would not ultimately hold the mortgages 
themselves, but that they would be sold off and packaged as mortgage-backed 
securities to be purchased by other investors. Enormous numbers of these securities 
were marketed to financial institutions around the world.35 Foreign holdings of 
Fannie and Freddie backed securities increased from $186 billion in 1998 to $875 
billion in 2004, and foreign holdings of asset-backed securities reach $835 billion at 
the height of the boom.36 
 
 When the housing price bubble burst, many houses fell in value just as 
increased payments under adjustable rate mortgages began to become due. Many 
borrowers defaulted, and the resulting oversupply of housing for sale caused prices 
to fall even more rapidly. Even though many borrowers remained solvent and 
continued to service their mortgages, no one knew exactly which mortgage-backed 
securities were backed by defaulting borrowers, and the value of all of them fell 
precipitously.37 
 
 This decline in the value of mortgage-backed securities occurred within a 
regulatory environment in which banks (and some other financial institutions) are 
ordinarily required by national regulators to maintain a “capital” cushion to protect 
depositors against a decline in the value of the bank’s assets. The logic of this 
“capital adequacy regulation” is that when the value of assets falls, the bank’s 
shareholders (and perhaps bondholders) will suffer the loss, and the bank will still 
have enough money to pay off its liabilities to depositors and certain other 
creditors.38 Capital adequacy regulation ensures that the bank’s net worth is 
sufficiently high that the bank will not become insolvent as a result of moderate 
shocks to the value of its assets. 
 
 Following a drop in the value of assets, regulators in principle will require 
banks to increase their capital holdings back to the required level by raising capital 
                                                        
35 Brummer, supra note _ at 211-213 (outlining the 2008 financial crisis); see also Krugman, Obstfeld 
& Melitz supra note _, at 543. 
36 See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 104 (2011) (“Inquiry Report”); 
Steven B. Kamin & Laurie Pounder DeMarco, How Did a Domestic Housing Slump Turn into a Global 
Financial Crisis 8 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve International Finance Discussion Paper 
No 994), FED. RES., (Jan. 2010), www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2010/994/ifdp994.pdf.  
37 See Inquiry Report, supra note _, at 222-223 (finding that although a relatively small percentage of 
homeowners were actually defaulting, seventy-five to ninety percent of securities based off 
mortgages were downgraded to “junk”); see also, Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 603. 
38 See Mishkin, supra note _, at 231–232.  
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or retaining earnings. Banks that are unable to do so may be closed or taken over by 
their governments (as happened to a number of banks during the financial crisis). 
 
B. The Gains From Cooperation on Capital Adequacy Requirements 
 
 The “welfare objectives” implicit in capital adequacy regulation are 
straightforward—a desire by national authorities to limit undue risk-taking by 
financial institutions, and to ensure that banks remain capable of meeting their 
obligations to depositors. The economic justification for such regulation is a belief 
that the owners and managers of banks are not monitored adequately by their 
creditors to ensure that they do not engage in excessive risk taking. An important 
reason is the widespread institution of deposit insurance, which dulls the incentive 
of depositors to worry about a prospect of bank insolvency, and also explains why 
governments regulate to protect their treasuries. Moreover, even absent deposit 
insurance, creditors may face a collective action problem in monitoring banks, and 
the temptation to free ride may allow banks excessive leeway to gamble with other 
people’s money – a gamble in which the bank enjoys the upside and others suffer 
much of the downside.39 
 
 Capital adequacy regulation originated at the national level. But in the 
modern economy, capital investment has become more and more mobile 
internationally. Many developed countries have increasingly relaxed so-called 
“capital controls” on foreign investment, allowing investment capital to flow 
wherever returns are the highest.40 The result is a set of significant externality 
problems with regulation. 
 
 First, significant numbers of creditors of domestic financial institutions may 
well be foreign nationals. As usual, theory suggests that the interest of foreign 
nationals may not be taken into account adequately by national regulators (at least 
to the degree that the national government does not insure their interests), which 
may lead to a tendency toward under-regulation when nations act unilaterally.  
 
 Second, and probably more important, the regulated entities themselves are 
backed by mobile capital. If the United States raises capital requirements on major 
banks in New York, for example, those banks may well have the capacity to move 
their operations to London. To the degree that political officials value the presence 
of domestic financial institutions, and those institutions have a credible threat to 
                                                        
39 See id. at 250, 252 
40 John Ravenhill, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 187 (2005) 
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move their operations abroad in response to stricter regulation, regulators may be 
further discouraged from imposing appropriate capital requirements. 
 
 These problems became increasingly prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, 
finally resulting in the first Basel Accord (Basel I) in 1988, in which the so-called G-
10 economies agreed on minimum capital requirements to be implemented in their 
domestic laws.41 The approach to regulation was modified and broadened to more 
countries in the Basel II Accord of 2004,42 which was in the process of being 
implemented when the financial crisis emerged. Among other things, Basel II added 
“market discipline,” based on disclosure obligations, to the regulatory arsenal. 
Subsequent to the financial crisis, yet a third agreement on capital adequacy 
regulation has been reached – Basel III – which introduces some further rules on 
bank liquidity and leverage.43 
 
C. Self-Enforcement in Capital Adequacy Cooperation 
 
 The Basel system is weakly institutionalized. Governments established a 
committee in the 1970s that would become known as the Basel Committee, which 
consists of the central bankers and financial regulators of its members. The 
Committee has no legal power. It operates by consensus with the understanding 
that when it reaches agreements, those agreements will be independently 
implemented through regulation or national legislation in the member countries.44 
 
 The complex details of these arrangements need not detain us. We simply 
offer the Basel accords as an example of a quasi-successful regime of cooperation on 
macroeconomic-related issues. The regime is partially successful in that it represents 
a fairly stable (approaching 25 years) approach to a well-defined international 
externality problem attributable to global capital mobility. It responds to the under-
regulation that theory predicts will arise absent international cooperation by 
obliging its members to take concrete measures to require increased bank capital, as 
well as to engage in certain collateral policies that reduce the riskiness of financial 
institutions, and by allocating supervisory authority over internationally active 
banks. The rules are in considerable measure precise and clear (Basel III increases 
the common stock requirement for banks to 4.5% of assets, for example45). The 
                                                        
41 See Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, 600-01. 
42 See id. 
43 The Basel III rules are summarized at Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms – Basel III, 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf (“Basel III 
Rules”). For historical background, see Duncan Wood, GOVERNING GLOBAL BANKING (2005). 
44 Wood, supra note _, at 45. 
45 See Basel III Rules, supra note _. 
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system is self-enforcing in the sense that significant deviation by national regulators 
(which we do not anticipate in ordinary times) will produce substantial pressure for 
regulators elsewhere to deviate. And national governments have actually 
implemented the Basel rules, incorporating them into domestic law and regulatory 
practice where presumably they have had effects on behavior.46 
 
 The regime has been quite unsuccessful in certain respects as well – after all, 
it failed to ward off the recent financial crisis. Basel II failed to result in greater 
capitalization of banks; indeed, it appears to have enabled large financial 
institutions to reduce capitalization by a fairly substantial amount.47 
 
There are three important reasons. First, bank regulators operating under 
Basel I and II simply did not appreciate the systemic risk associated with innovative 
financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities. The risk associated with 
these instruments was far greater than either regulators or market participants 
realized, and thus the risk posture of many major financial institutions was far more 
aggressive than the capital adequacy standards in place were designed to address.48 
 
Second, a number of scholars believe that Basel was “captured” by large 
banks, which manipulated the process in order to ensure that they would be lightly 
regulated.49 One of the innovations of Basel II was a rule that permitted banks to use 
their own models in order to calculate credit risk instead of complying with the 
default capital adequacy standards, which were quite crude. Only large banks could 
afford to run those models and take advantage of this rule, and those banks were 
able to reduce their capitalization while other banks were required to increase 
capitalization.50 One scholar traces this rule and related rules to an intense lobbying 
campaign undertaken by the large banks.51 
                                                        
46 See Wood, supra note _, at 99 (discussing the impact of the 1988 accord on the market), and at 153-
57 (surveying the effects of the regime as a whole). 
47 Ranjit Lall, Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III Is Doomed (Global Economic Governance 
Working Paper), 7, GLOBAL ECON. GOVERNANCE (OCT. 2009),  
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/GEG-Working-paper-Ranjit-
Lall.pdf.  
48 See Inquiry Report, supra note _, at 20-22, 99-100. 
49 See, e.g., Lall, supra note _, at 11 (arguing that financial institutions that were the first movers in 
counseling the Basel Committee exerted the most influence); Stephany Griffith-Jones & Avinash 
Persaud, The Political Economy of Basel II, 5, THE U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AM., (Apr. 2003), 
http://www.eclac.cl/noticias/discursos/2/12152/Griffith-Jones-Persaud.pdf (arguing that the 
limited regulation of large banks relative to smaller banks is an indication of industry capture). 
50 See Inquiry Report, supra note _, at 7. 
51 See id. For related accounts of the “failure” of Basel, see Wood, supra note _  (arguing that United 
State weakened regulation to advance interests of U.S. banks); see also Magnus Bertling Bjerke, 
Experts, Banks and Politics, 84, 91-92, INT’L REL. SECURITY NETWORK, (2007), 
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 Third, international cooperation in this area has also been hampered by 
another fundamental problem rooted in the very nature of capital adequacy 
regulation – a time inconsistency problem. In popular discourse, this problem is also 
known as the “too big to fail” issue. If the incentives associated with capital 
adequacy regulation are to perform properly, regulated institutions must believe 
that the rules will be enforced if the institution finds itself in financial trouble – 
shareholders will be wiped out, the bank will be closed and liquidated, and so forth. 
If a financial crisis afflicts an enormous financial institution, however, much less a 
cluster of them as occurred during the financial crisis, the threat to enforce the rules 
can lose its credibility. The disruption to the economy from closing large financial 
institutions may be extensive, producing a crisis of confidence that produces a run 
on other financial institutions and imperils their liquidity. In addition, the costs to 
the treasury of closing big institutions and making good on deposit insurance 
promises can be enormous. The result is that regulators can be dissuaded from 
enforcing the rules in the event of a systemic crisis, and central banks are pushed 
inexorably toward supplying financial institutions with the resources to cover their 
losses (a “bailout”).52 
 
 If major financial institutions can anticipate this scenario (and they surely 
can, since it has happened), they will know that in hard times the rules will not be 
enforced. That will diminish the incentive to avoid excessive risk-taking and 
undermine the integrity of the regulatory regime. 
 
 For these reasons, we suspect that international cooperation under a regime 
such as Basel III can only be expected to work well in ordinary times, when 
occasionally banks may find themselves in trouble but the system as a whole is not 
threatened. Its ability to avoid large, systemic crises, by contrast, is more suspect.53 
 
 Systemic crises might be avoided, to be sure, by imposing such substantial 
capital requirements that all banks can be insulated from massive unanticipated 
shocks. The costs of restricting bank activity to this extent may easily exceed the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-
2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=48049 (arguing that Basel II was excessively influenced by narrow 
national interests because of the differing national regulatory regimes); Griffith-Jones & Persaud, 
supra note _ (arguing that developed countries used the process to take advantage of developing 
countries by disincentivizing investments in developing nations that would diversify portfolios). 
52 Inquiry Report supra note _, at 57, 228, 369 (providing an example of the costs of potential 
depository runs). 
53 This seems to be the conclusion of a book-length examination of the Basel system, which describes 
the success of the system as “limited”: it has not prevented crises but it has contributed to 
international financial stability. Wood, supra note _, at 4. 
16 
benefits, however, and in any case may not be politically viable. Alternatively, 
regulators might seek to become more deeply involved in managing bank asset 
portfolios by placing more restrictions or prohibitions on particular types of risky 
investments. The ability of regulators to do so in a useful fashion may be doubted, 
however, particularly in light of the fact that the assets that nearly brought down the 
financial system in 2007-2008—mortgage-backed securities—were not recognized 
for the risks they created until it was far too late. Lastly, as some have advocated,54 
the largest banks “too big to fail” might be broken up into smaller banks, but the 
costs of fracturing such large national or global financial institutions may be a 
significant loss of scale economies and other efficiencies, and may again be a 
political non-starter. 
 
IV. A Failed Regime: Fixed Exchange Rates (and the Euro-Zone?) 
 
 We now move into more complex areas of macroeconomic policy in which 
international cooperation has proven a failure despite the presence of important 
international externalities. As we shall see, the complexity of the policy issues in 
play is a key reason for the failure of cooperation, although not the only reason. In 
this section, we consider various historical efforts of the international community to 
establish a regime of fixed exchange rates. After some background discussion, we 
consider the gold standard, the Bretton Woods system under the IMF, and the role 
of currency unions with emphasis on the Euro-zone.  The next section considers a 
broader set of issues pertaining to monetary (and fiscal) policy cooperation. 
 
A. Background on Exchange Rates 
 
 An “exchange rate” is the price at which one national currency may be sold 
for another. From the perspective of a national of any country, the set of exchange 
rates on various currencies are simply the prices of foreign monies. 
 
 In a world without foreign commerce, exchange rates would be of no interest 
to anyone; all transactions would be domestic and no one would have any need for 
foreign money. But once trade in goods, services, and capital assets becomes 
possible, exchange rates become important. Consider a seller of goods in the United 
States and a buyer in Europe. The seller would like to exchange goods for dollars, 
which she can spend in the United States. But the buyer will normally own Euros. So 
                                                        
54 See, e.g., Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Efficient Banking Act of 2010, 111th Cong. 2d, S. 3241 
(proposing legislation that breaks up banks that are too big to fail), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s3241is/pdf/BILLS-111s3241is.pdf; Jonathan R. Macey & 
James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 
YALE L. J. 1368 (2011) (arguing that when a bank becomes too big to fail, it should be broken up). 
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in order to engage in a transaction, either the buyer will need to exchange euros for 
dollars and give the seller dollars, or the seller will need to exchange the euros she 
receives for dollars. Whichever the case, one party will need to exchange local 
currency for foreign currency. To do so, the party will typically go to an 
intermediary such as a bank, which owns both types of currency. The intermediary 
will offer to make an exchange at the prevailing exchange rate. 
 
1. Market-Determined Exchange Rates 
 
 What determines the exchange rate? Consider a simple setting, without any 
government intervention by assumption, where people in two countries (Europe 
and America) trade goods and services across borders but do not trade capital 
assets (again by assumption). Europeans will sell goods and services to Americans, 
for example, only as long as Americans sell goods and services in return that 
Europeans want to buy, and vice versa. Trade must “balance” in the sense that the 
value of what the United States imports from Europe equals the value of what the 
United States exports to Europe.55 If Europeans start buying more imports than they 
sell in return, the excess demand for U.S. dollars to make the purchases will cause 
the dollar to appreciate relative to the Euro, which in turn will cause American 
exports to become more expensive for Europeans, which will cause Europeans to 
import less, and thus trade to return to balance. In this simple framework, the 
dollar-euro exchange rate is the relative price of the two currencies that balances 
export/import demand and supply.56 
 
 In turn, any exchange rate movements under these circumstances reflect 
changes in export and import demand and supply factors. If, for example, prices rise 
in the United States (maybe a strike or storm reduces the cotton crop), then 
European demand for the now-more expensive goods will decline. Europeans will 
then demand fewer dollars, and the dollar will depreciate. If Europeans become 
more enamored with American goods, then they will demand more dollars to buy 
those goods, and the dollar will appreciate. If American industry becomes more 
productive, then U.S. goods will become cheaper, Europeans will demand more of 
them and thus the dollars to buy them, and the dollar will appreciate. If the 
American government imposes tariffs on European goods, then Americans will 
                                                        
55 Formal models of balanced trade typically omit exchange rates altogether; they simply require that 
the value of imports equal the value of exports measured in terms of some numeraire good. See 
Avinash K. Dixit & Victor Norman, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 80 et. seq. (1980). 
56 With more than two countries, bilateral trade need not balance but aggregate imports and exports 
for each country would balance, and equilibrium exchange rates would ensure this market-clearing 
condition holds in each country.  
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demand fewer Europeans goods and the euros to buy them, and the dollar will 
appreciate causing American exports to decline as well.  And so on. 
 
 In the real world, balanced trade does not necessarily occur because the 
purchase of goods and services from abroad is not the only possible use of foreign 
money. When Europeans start buying up more American exports, Americans might 
take their additional euros and use them not to buy European goods and services 
but to buy European capital assets, including European sovereign and corporate 
bonds, stocks, real estate, and so forth. Such transactions in capital assets afford an 
alternative use for foreign currency, and so the equilibrium exchange rate (without 
government intervention) is not the rate that balances trade in goods and services, 
but that balances the demand and supply of foreign money, a component of which is 
associated with capital transactions.  
 
 National income accounting distinguishes between the “current account,” 
which refers to trade in goods and services, and the “capital account,” which refers 
to investments of various sorts. In our example above, Europe has a current account 
deficit if it imports more goods and services than it exports, but a capital account 
surplus because Americans use the surplus euros to purchase European capital 
assets. The exchange rate may remain stable under these circumstances even 
though trade flows alone are unbalanced. 
 
 The willingness of investors to use foreign exchange to buy foreign capital 
assets depends on the relative rate of return on investment across countries. If the 
interest rate on bonds in Europe is high relative to that in the United States, for 
example, then European bonds will be more attractive, other things being equal, and 
Americans are more likely to buy them. In valuing European assets, Americans will 
take account of all the other factors that affect their expected return—for example, 
future price levels, demand, trade barriers, and productivity. Absent restrictions on 
international capital flows, exchange rate equilibrium requires that the risk-
adjusted rate of return on assets denominated in each currency be the same; 
otherwise, capital flows will chase higher returns until parity is achieved.57 
 
2. The Exchange Rate with Government Intervention 
 
 It is not immediately obvious why governments should wish to intervene in 
exchange markets. The market is extremely liquid—trillions of dollars of foreign 
                                                        
57 See Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 339-43. 
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exchange are traded every day. And nothing we have said so far suggests that the 
market creates negative externalities. 
 
 Nonetheless, governments have intervened frequently in foreign exchange 
markets, and even when they do not consciously “intervene,” their policies may 
affect exchange rates. The mechanism of direct intervention is fairly simple. If a 
nation wishes to lower the price of its currency, it sells that currency for foreign 
currencies – the increased supply of its currency will tend to depress the price, just 
as increased supply into any market with fixed demand will tend to lower prices. A 
nation that sells its currency and accumulates foreign currency builds up “foreign 
exchange reserves.” Likewise, if a nation wishes to increase the price of its currency, 
it reverses the process and sells foreign exchange reserves to buy up its currency. By 
creating additional demand for its own currency, the nation should cause its 
currency to appreciate.58 
 
 When nations intervene for the purpose of altering the exchange rate, they 
do so for a number of reasons relating to the fact that short-term exchange rates can 
fluctuate dramatically. One is that firms may be unwilling to engage in foreign trade 
because of the attendant risk. 59 An American firm that promises to pay €1,000 for a 
widget in one week, may be willing to enter the contract at the current exchange 
rate, where the dollar cost is, say, $1,200, but not at an exchange rate where the cost 
could be $1,500 or $2,000 for the €1,000 needed to consummate the contract. Even 
if current exchange rates were unbiased predictors of future rates, so that adverse 
shifts were no more likely than favorable shifts, risk-averse traders would curtail 
their trading activity due to this “exchange risk.”  
 
 To address the problem of exchange risk, countries have tried at various 
times to maintain a relatively constant exchange rate through government 
intervention. A country may do this unilaterally by “pegging” its currency to that of a 
foreign country, such as the United States. The country attempts to calculate the 
long-run exchange rate and then use government intervention to counter short-run 
deviations from it.60 Alternatively, the government may intervene in currency 
markets simply to dampen volatility and reduce risk by countering any short-term 
price swings.  
 
 The empirical importance of exchange risk in trade is unclear, but 
economists doubt that this problem is as serious as it first appears in modern 
                                                        
58 See Mishkin, supra note _, at 529-533. 
59 See Peter H. Lindert, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 432 ( 9th ed. 1991). 
60 For more on pegging see Mishkin, supra note _, at 552-553. 
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markets due to a large market in derivatives that enable firms to hedge cheaply 
against exchange rate risk.61 The firm in the above example can simply enter the 
forward market and purchase the necessary euros at a determinate rate for delivery 
on the date when payment under the contract is required. 
 
 A second concern regarding short-term exchange rate fluctuations is that 
they may send false signals to the market that distort resource allocation. 62 
Governments may fear, for example, that speculators will distort the price of its 
currency relative to some “true” value that reflects long-term market equilibrium.63 
Such behavior might cause investors to invest in the wrong industries—for example, 
in the export industry of a country whose currency has been artificially forced 
down, but which will rise to its true value after the investments have been sunk. If 
governments can perceive the true value of the currency, however, then they can 
counter these short-term movements away from equilibrium rates and thus prevent 
the price distortions. This can be true only if the government has better information 
than the market does and can identify the “true” value of the exchange rate, which 
many economists doubt. 
 
 Countries may also intervene in foreign exchange markets to increase 
domestic employment by retarding imports and stimulating exports (through 
devaluation), a policy that may effectively amount to cheating on trade 
commitments.64 If Chile and Peru agree to eliminate tariffs on each other’s exports, 
then each country will experience growth in its export sector, but import-competing 
industries will suffer. The import-competing industries will then pressure the 
governments to help them. If a government decides that it cannot renege on the 
trade deal, it can at least temporarily produce an effect similar to that of a tariff by 
devaluing its currency, making imports more expensive in terms of domestic 
currency. Indeed, such a policy would help its exporters as well by making exports 
cheaper in terms of foreign currency.65  
 
 In addition to these reasons for intervention aimed at altering exchange 
rates, many government policies can affect exchange rates by changing the supply or 
demand for domestic currency. For example, countries may prefer to keep certain 
                                                        
61 Lindert, supra note _, at 434. 
62 See Richard N. Cooper, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 141-43 (1987). 
63 Lindert supra note _, at 416-20. 
64 See Cooper, supra note _. 
65 The discussion here assumes that imports are priced in foreign currency and exports in domestic 
currency, a condition that need not always hold. It also assumes that other prices do not adjust to 
offset the exchange rate movement, another assumption that may not hold, especially in the “long 
run.” We have more to say about such issues below. 
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capital assets in domestic hands because of political and national security 
sensitivities.66 As an illustration, the United States has refused to allow Chinese and 
Middle Eastern entities to purchase sensitive installations such as ports.67 Other 
countries have also limited foreign investment in marquee firms such as national 
airlines. When investments are prohibited for such reasons, demand for the 
domestic currency falls and the currency may depreciate. 
 
 Related, some countries limit foreign investment because experience has 
taught that foreign investors may withdraw their investments precipitously when 
problems arise. As the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s showed, the rapid 
withdrawal of foreign capital can produce a collapse in local currency and asset 
values, resulting in enormous economic dislocation. One way to control such 
behavior is to limit the right of foreign investors to convert their currency into and 
out of domestic currency for the purpose of buying or selling domestic investments, 
a type of policy known as “capital controls,” which also have obvious exchange rate 
implications. 
 
 Another possibility is that nations may wish to unload foreign reserves that 
they fear may depreciate in the future. China has accumulated large dollar reserves 
through the years, for example, and should China fear a future depreciation of the 
dollar, it might sell them, which would have the effect of increasing the value of its 
currency relative to the dollar. 
 
 Exchange rates are also affected by countercyclical policies. For example, a 
country’s central bank may use monetary policy in an effort to stimulate its 
economy. One way to do so is to make loans to banks at low interest rates, enabling 
banks in turn to make cheaper loans to customers, thus stimulating borrowing and 
investment. When a central bank loans money to banks, it effectively expands the 
money supply, which naturally tends to lower the price of its money relative to 
other things, including foreign currency. Likewise, low interest rates reduce the 
return on investments in local assets denominated in the local currency, which may 
lead investors to shift investment toward foreign capital assets. To do so, they must 
buy foreign currency, which will also cause the value of foreign currency to 
appreciate. 
 
                                                        
66 See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 
U.S. DEP’T TREAS., (Apr. 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
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67 See, e.g., Deborah L. Cohen, Overseas Oversight, 94 A.B.A.J. 22 (2008) (detailing U.S. government 
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B. Gains From Cooperation on Exchange Rate Movements 
 
 Thus far we have focused on reasons why a government may seek to 
influence the price of its currency acting unilaterally, and how it may indirectly 
influence its price through other policies. It is a short step to identifying 
international externalities that result from policies that directly or indirectly move 
the exchange rate. 
 
 First, short-term exchange rate fluctuations affect foreign actors as well as 
domestic actors. To the degree that exchange risk is important in trade, one might 
expect governments to undersupply efforts to reduce it because some of the benefits 
flow to foreigners. Similarly, to the degree that short-term fluctuations send 
incorrect signals to markets that distort resource allocation, some of the costs will 
be borne by foreigners and once again we might expect governments to 
undersupply policies aimed at avoiding exchange rate distortions. 
 
 Second and related, to the degree that exchange rates persistently deviate 
from “equilibrium” values in ways that governments can identify, the actors whose 
decisions are affected and who bear the costs of subsequent “corrections” in the 
rates may be foreign investors or trading partners whose sunk investments are 
imperiled by the return to equilibrium.  
 
 Third, and in line with some of the recent criticism of China’s policies to 
prevent the appreciation of the RMB, any efforts by governments to devalue their 
currency to stimulate exports and to protect import-competing industries will 
impose costs on import-competing firms abroad and on foreign exporters. The net 
effect of such policies on aggregate foreign welfare can be subtle,68 but there is little 
doubt that from a political standpoint foreign nations may complain bitterly about 
such actions. Indeed, unanticipated devaluations may effectively renege on trade 
bargains made with other nations, as noted, at least until other prices adjust to 
compensate. 
 
 Such policies may also push competitors toward policy interventions that 
they would prefer not to undertake. If China maintains an artificially weak RMB 
relative to the dollar to simulate exports, Brazil may be forced (politically) to do the 
same with respect to the real lest its exports to the United States become 
uncompetitive vis-à-vis Chinese exports. Thus, for example, in response to some 
shock that lowers the value of the dollar, both China and Brazil may sell their own 
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currencies and buy dollars to keep their currency values low, causing domestic 
inflation that may have problematic internal effects.69 
 
 Fourth, the sorts of policies that indirectly affect exchange rates may also 
impose costs on foreigners. When countries use investment restrictions and capital 
controls, for example, foreign investors may suffer reduced investment 
opportunities. Such effects again require that the potential capital-importing nation 
be “large,” in the sense that a denial of access to its investment opportunities will 
reduce the returns that foreign investors can make because they do not have equally 
good opportunities elsewhere. These costs to foreign investors are neglected when 
nations unilaterally set their policies regarding foreign investments. 
 
 Similarly, countercyclical policies that affect exchange rates can have various 
externalities. In response to the financial crisis, for example, the United States has 
adopted a loose monetary policy hoping to stimulate the economy, driving interest 
rates on many investments in the United States to unprecedented low levels. 
Investors have responded by seeking to invest abroad where interest rates are 
higher. This flow of investment capital abroad is not always welcome. Various 
foreign governments have recently complained, for example, that the inflow of 
foreign investment capital is driving up the price of their currencies, forcing them to 
intervene by selling their currencies to maintain export competitiveness.70 The 
result is a concern for inflation. The capital inflows also raise fears of asset bubbles 
that may eventually collapse and produce serious dislocation. 
 
 Various forms of cooperation can, in principle, ameliorate these externalities. 
Some efforts are targeted at particular, problematic practices. With respect to 
intervention that might undermine trade commitments, Article XV(4) of GATT 
provides that members of GATT “shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent” 
of GATT.71 Likewise, IMF Article IV(1)(iv) provides that members “shall…avoid 
manipulating exchange rates…to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other 
members.”72 Neither provision has ever been enforced in a meaningful way, but they 
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at least bespeak an awareness of how exchange rate measures can undermine a 
liberal trading system.  
 
 Our focus in this section, however, is on various efforts through the years to 
address some of the above-noted externalities by creating a system of fixed 
exchange rates. Fixed exchange rates obviously eliminate the problems associated 
with short-term volatility, and if rates are set properly (and adjusted if necessary) 
toward the long-term “equilibrium” rate, the costs of sustained deviations from that 
level and abrupt subsequent adjustments can be avoided. Likewise, fixed exchange 
rates prevent devaluation for the purposes of undermining trade commitments. 
 
 Interestingly, however, efforts to create fixed exchange rates on a global scale 
have proven failures. We now consider those efforts and the reasons for the lack of 
success.   
 
C.  The Failure of Self-Enforcing Cooperation on Fixed Exchange Rates 
 
 We now address two significant efforts to maintain fixed exchange rates. The 
first involved the “gold standard” of the early 1900s. This system waxed and waned, 
and eventually collapsed around the time of the Great Depression. Then, following 
World War II, a modified version of the gold standard was devised under the 
auspices of the IMF. That arrangement too collapsed in the early 1970s, leaving 
behind the modern system of floating rates that persists today. 
 
1.  The Gold Standard 
 
 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most major countries 
adhered to the gold standard. Under the gold standard, every country promised to 
redeem its currency for gold. In the United States, for example, a person could 
redeem a dollar for one twentieth of an ounce of gold from the U.S. Treasury. In 
Great Britain, a pound was redeemable for a quarter of an ounce of gold. Thus, a 
person who owned a pound could convert it into five dollars by exchanging the 
pound for gold and the gold for dollars. In this way, the gold standard created a 
system of fixed exchange rates.73 
 
 Countries were not bound by international law to adhere to the gold 
standard. The standard emerged in a decentralized fashion as more and more 
countries saw advantages in committing themselves to redeem their currencies in 
gold, although policymakers saw the advantages of gold convertibility for 
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international trade and investment as early as 1867 and agreed to move in that 
direction.74 Probably the most important argument for using the gold standard is 
that it introduced monetary stability, preventing countries from simply printing 
currency and causing inflation. If the currency is linked to gold and a government 
issues too much currency (promoting inflation), the holders of money will wish to 
redeem it for gold. Aware of this prospect, monetary authorities exercise restraint in 
the issuance of currency. The money supply then increases or decreases with the 
supply of gold reserves, which was thought to be relatively stable. Many 
governments were attracted to the gold standard for this reason alone, a domestic 
benefit from the gold standard that did not depend on any international 
cooperation. 
 
 A further advantage of the gold standard, however, was that when many 
countries adopted it, a fixed exchange rate was established, which eliminated or 
greatly reduced problems associated with exchange rate fluctuations. Thus, the gold 
standard can be seen as a form of informal international cooperation over exchange 
rates. 
 
 Modern scholarship suggests, however, that the supposed advantages of the 
gold standard were greatly exaggerated.75 For one thing, governments were free to 
leave the gold standard or (more commonly) to devalue their currency by 
announcing that they would redeem it for smaller amounts of gold than in the past. 
Thus, the gold standard did not really bind governments, and it did not create as 
much exchange rate stability as people often think. In fact, periods of competitive 
devaluations were observed, in which multiple nations sought to take advantage of 
the way that devaluation can stimulate exports and reduce imports. 
 
 In addition, there is a disadvantage in linking the national money supply to 
gold reserves. Over the long term, the money supply should increase at roughly the 
same rate that the economy grows, so that people will have sufficient money to 
engage in the greater number of transactions. But the supply of gold does not 
depend on the size of the world economy, let alone the size of any particular 
country’s economy, but varies depending on the technology of gold extraction and 
the happenstance of gold discovery. Under the gold standard, the production of gold 
varied greatly over time leading to periods of inflation and deflation.76 The gold 
standard thus does not really lead to price stability – the value of money in terms of 
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a quantity of gold is stable, but if the price of gold fluctuates relative to other things, 
the value of money in terms of other things fluctuates as well. 
 
 A further possible disadvantage of the gold standard is that it prevents 
governments from using monetary policy for countercyclical purposes—a common 
policy in practice, albeit one that is controversial among some economists. A 
standard policy prescription during a recession is for the central bank to lower 
interest rates to stimulate borrowing and investment.77 To lower interest rates, 
central banks may loan money to banks more cheaply, or use money to buy up 
government bonds, raising their prices and reducing effective yields in the economy. 
Both sorts of policies increase the money supply, and can only be undertaken with a 
gold-backed money (without jeopardizing gold reserves) if the government 
concurrently acquires more gold, which may not be possible. Because many 
countries were on the gold standard at the start of the Great Depression, they could 
not lower interest rates without jeopardizing their gold reserves, and many 
economists who believe in the efficacy of countercyclical monetary policy thus 
blame the gold standard for contributing to the severity of the economic downturn. 
 
 Not only did the gold standard interfere with expansionary monetary policies 
during economic downturns, but it led to some unfortunate externalities resulting 
from the strategic interaction among central banks. Imagine that the world consists 
of two countries, both on the gold standard.78 Each country has a central bank that 
wishes to preserve some flexibility to lower interest rates in the event of an 
economic downturn. But each knows that increased demand for its gold reserves 
will result for the reasons noted above. Thus, to build up its stock of reserves in 
anticipation of possible economic downturns, each central bank may wish to 
increase interest rates to make investment in their country more attractive. Such a 
policy attracts foreign investment, and foreigners will thus be led to trade gold for 
domestic currency to engage in investment. But if both central banks follow this 
policy, they may end up with higher interest rates, which may tend to reduce 
economic growth, while accomplishing little to attract foreign investment and thus 
doing little to increase their gold reserves. To avoid this unfortunate outcome, the 
central banks must cooperate, and the cooperation must go beyond simply sticking 
to the gold standard; they must also cooperate by agreeing not to compete 
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excessively for gold. This may be quite difficult to do, and such cooperation was 
apparently not very successful in practice.79 
 
 Two key lessons emerge from the history of the gold standard. First, with the 
benefit of hindsight it is not clear that it served state’s interests to maintain fixed 
exchange rates through the gold standard. The benefits of fixed exchange rates (such 
as exchange rate stability) may not have exceeded the costs—the reduced flexibility 
for addressing economic crises, and so forth. The gold standard had the virtue of 
being simple and clear, but in the end may have proven oversimple and 
inadequately tailored to changing conditions. A more sophisticated form of 
cooperation, allowing flexibility to deviate from the gold standard when justified but 
not otherwise, might have been possible in principle but did not emerge in practice.  
 
 Second, the gold standard was not self-enforcing. At first sight, it seems like a 
simple coordination game: every country benefits by adhering to the same standard, 
and no country does better by leaving that standard once other countries have 
joined it. But that view is too sanguine. When countries experience economic 
shocks, it is not necessarily in their interest to stay on the gold standard. Likewise, 
although nominally adhering to a gold standard, countries can still engage in 
unilateral devaluation and did so at times. Countries harmed by a decision to 
abandon the standard or to devalue had no retaliatory response that was sufficient 
to discourage such conduct. At most, they could devalue or abandon the gold 
standard themselves, which would sacrifice whatever benefits it might have yielded 
(such as domestic monetary discipline), and would not do much to “punish” the 
country that initially deviated. The theoretically optimal form of retaliation against a 
single deviator whose action harms multiple countries is a joint response, but a joint 
response is itself subject to a collective action problem, which countries were unable 
to overcome. 
  
2. Bretton Woods 
 
 During World War II, the allied powers met in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire to discuss the post-War economic order. Two new institutions were 
conceived – the World Bank and the IMF – with the latter tasked to administer a 
new system of fixed exchange rates. Under this system, the United States—by far the 
largest economy in the world—agreed to exchange dollars for gold at the rate of $35 
per ounce. Other countries purchased dollars in order to establish their foreign 
currency reserves, and agreed to peg their currency to the dollar. Thus, if the market 
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price of their currency rose above the exchange rate, a foreign country’s central 
bank would sell their currency in return for dollars, which would force the value of 
their currency back down to the official exchange rate. If the market price of their 
currency fell below the exchange rate, the central bank would do the opposite.80 
 
 The IMF was to play a supervisory role, and to serve as a lender to countries 
that ran short of foreign exchange reserves. Countries initially set their exchange 
rate after negotiations with the IMF; their exchange rate would reflect what the 
country and IMF agreed (or hoped) was the long-term market rate, which of course 
could differ from the actual rate at any given time. Once the exchange rate had been 
set, the central bank of each country (other than the United States) was obliged to 
use dollars to buy its currency and to sell its currency for dollars in order to 
maintain the exchange rate. The U.S. government was obliged to maintain the dollar 
exchange rate with gold, which meant that it had to agree to redeem dollars for gold 
at $35 an ounce.81 
 
 Countries that could not maintain the value of their currencies were 
permitted to devalue their currencies with the permission of the IMF. The idea was 
to permit “orderly” variations in exchange rates consistent with their long-term 
value and to avoid short-term fluctuations. Thus, IMF supervision in principle would 
prevent countries from manipulating their exchange rates (for example, to promote 
exports or otherwise to cheat on trade agreements), while allowing them to adjust 
their exchange rates to keep them in line with the fundamentals, such as relative 
productivity. The IMF possessed a single carrot (or stick, depending on one’s 
perspective). It could lend money to countries that agreed to abide by its rules if 
they experienced balance of payments difficulties due to an outflow of foreign 
exchange reserves. Often, the IMF would condition such loans on changes in 
government policies to abate the balance of payments problem, such as tighter 
monetary and fiscal policies to support the value of the domestic currency (so-called 
“IMF conditionality”).82 
 
 The Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971. The main reason for its failure 
lay with the central role of the United States. Unlike other countries, the United 
States could not devalue the dollar; it was required to trade dollars for a fixed 
quantity of gold. But as other countries recovered from World War II, their 
productivity increased at a faster rate than the productivity of the U.S. economy, and 
                                                        
80 For a discussion of the Bretton Woods system, see Dam, supra note _. 
81 Mishkin, supra note _, at 536. 
82 For a debate on the virtues of “IMF conditionality” see Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 
650. 
29 
thus, as required by the long-term model of the exchange rate, the U.S. dollar should 
have depreciated. Meanwhile, the United States had pursued inflationary monetary 
policy, which further reduced the value of the dollar. As a result, the market value of 
gold rose dramatically above $35 per ounce. An effort was made to maintain a two-
tier gold market, in which the price of gold for private use rose much above $35 per 
ounce, and only central banks could redeem U.S. dollars for gold.83 But that too 
proved unsustainable as the amount of U.S. currency in foreign hands eventually 
exceeded U.S. gold reserves, creating a “confidence problem.” Central banks 
elsewhere became wary of holding more dollars, as they would have to do to 
prevent their currencies from appreciating. It became clear that the demand on U.S. 
gold reserves would exceed U.S. ability to meet it, and in 1971 President Nixon 
“closed the gold window” and ended the ability of foreign central banks to redeem 
dollars for gold.84  
 
 Part of the problem also lay in the fact that as the United States pursued 
inflationary policies, other nations were forced to intervene by selling their 
currencies to maintain their pegs to the dollar. This policy expanded their own 
money supplies and produced undesirable inflation in their own economies.85   
 
 Accordingly, the system quickly unraveled. Foreign central banks no longer 
had any incentive to maintain their pegs to the dollar, and most major economic 
powers gravitated toward allowing their exchange rates to float in the market, albeit 
with periodic intervention to counter swings in exchange rates that they deemed 
undesirable – a system of “managed float.” Currently, most of the major currencies 
float in this fashion, although a few major economic powers (notably China) have 
tried to maintain a dollar peg.  
 
 The lessons of the Bretton Woods system are similar to those of the gold 
standard years. Indeed, Bretton Woods was at bottom a modified gold standard. To 
the degree that it worked, the system created price stability and reduced exchange 
rate fluctuations, particularly in the short term, but this benefit came at the cost of 
constraining the monetary policies of central banks in ways that became 
objectionable, and pressures to devalue arose just as in the days of the gold 
standard. Likewise, divergence in factors such as rates of growth in productivity 
across countries caused the fixed exchange rates established under IMF auspices to 
diverge from long-term market equilibrium values. In principle, the system was 
supposed to allow nations flexibility to adjust exchange rates under IMF 
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supervision, but in practice devaluations were politically controversial and 
destabilizing. If the IMF was to prevent countries from “manipulating” their 
currencies while permitting them to “adjust” them in response to structural 
changes, clear rules were needed for distinguishing one from the other. But it is 
questionable whether IMF had the capacity to distinguish these types of behavior. 
 
 Likewise, the system was simply not self-enforcing. Countries with more 
efficient economies and more restrictive monetary policies could sell their 
currencies to maintain their pegs, accumulating gold-backed dollars without bearing 
much cost to sustain the system. Countries with less efficient economies, by 
contrast, or more expansionary monetary policies, faced pressures to devalue and a 
potential shortage of foreign exchange reserves (or gold in the case of the United 
States). Eventually, these countries found it less costly to opt out of the system 
rather than bear its costs. Put simply, changing circumstances put nations in 
violation of their participation constraints, and other nations had no viable way to 
prevent them from defecting.  
 
D. Monetary Union and the Euro-Zone 
 
 Monetary union takes place when sovereign states give up their national 
currencies and accept a single supranational currency controlled by a supranational 
central bank. The noteworthy example of a major monetary union in modern times 
is the European Monetary Union established by the Maastricht Treaty.86 The 
monetary union began officially in 1999 with the creation of the euro and the 
establishment of the European Central Bank. Its founding eleven members were 
subsequently joined by six others. The other ten members of the European Union 
either did not qualify under the rules for joining the Euro-zone or opted out of it. 
 
 A monetary union creates several potentially significant benefits for its 
members.87 First, because a common currency exists, commercial actors no longer 
need to exchange currencies. The cost of such exchanges is eliminated, and cross-
border transactions become cheaper. 
 
 Second, monetary union eliminates exchange rate risk, simply because 
everyone uses the same money.  Indeed, monetary union is just a particularly rigid 
type of fixed exchange rate regime, in which central banks forfeit any opportunity to 
devalue. 
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 Third, to the extent that there are gains from international monetary policy 
cooperation, as discussed earlier, a monetary union facilitates that cooperation. 
Because there is a single central bank that controls the money supply, that central 
bank can in theory “internalize the externalities” within the union from monetary 
policy and avoid the possible issues that arise when policies are chosen non-
cooperatively by members of the union. Note, however, that the central bank cannot 
tailor policy separately to the needs of individual members, a limitation that we will 
turn to shortly. 
 
 Fourth, there are possible political benefits from monetary union. Indeed, in 
many accounts of European monetary integration, the political benefits played a 
more important role in motivating policymakers than the economic benefits did. In 
Europe, many policymakers believed that monetary integration would help 
strengthen the long-term process of European integration by further binding 
member states together and establishing shared institutions.88 Political integration 
would strengthen the stability of Europe, helping to avoid a recurrence of the wars 
of the first half of the twentieth century, and enable Europe to act in a more unified 
way in international relations. 
 
 But monetary union also imposes costs on states. The chief cost is that it 
disables states from pursuing independent monetary policies.89 Recall that many 
economists and virtually all central banks support countercyclical monetary policy. 
To use a current example, Greece is mired in a profound economic slump, while 
Germany has been enjoying modest economic growth. If each country had its own 
central bank, then the Greek central bank could expand the money supply, while the 
German central bank could keep the lid on inflation. With monetary union, the 
European central bank cannot choose the optimal monetary policy for each country 
separately because there is only one money supply. Instead, the European central 
bank must balance the interests of Germany and Greece, as well as those of the other 
Euro-zone countries, and choose a monetary policy that is optimal for the union as a 
whole. 
 
 The balance of these costs and benefits depends on the setting, and is the 
topic of the theory of optimal currency unions associated with Robert Mundell.90 
Mundell identifies four factors that determine whether a group of states should 
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create a currency union, all of which relate to the possibility that economic 
conditions within the union may be more or less variable across members. 
 
 First, a currency union is more likely to be jointly beneficial if the member 
states’ economies are sufficiently similar, so that they are generally subject to the 
same macroeconomic shocks and experience a common business cycle. Then, the 
common monetary policy in the union can respond to events that affect the 
members of the union more or less uniformly. For example, two states that depend 
heavily on oil revenues will be subject to much the same shocks—an increase in 
demand when other countries experience economic growth or war breaks out in the 
Middle East, a decrease in demand when new sources of oil are discovered in 
foreign countries. These countries might make plausible candidates for monetary 
union, but it would be inadvisable to add a country that suffers significant economic 
downturns when the price of oil rises. 
 
 Second (and third), monetary union is more likely to be jointly beneficial 
when capital and labor are mobile between members of the union. Both of these 
factors are related to the problem of unsynchronized macroeconomic shocks. If a 
recession strikes one state, but unemployed workers can quickly move to the other 
state, the negative effect of the shock is less than it would otherwise be. The same 
point can be made about capital mobility. Another way of putting this point is that if 
labor mobility and capital mobility are high, then unsynchronized shocks are less 
likely to occur in the first place, or their effects will be more limited. Thus, it is less 
important for the member states to be able to pursue separate countercyclical 
monetary policies. 
 
 Fourth, monetary union is more likely to be jointly beneficial when the states 
have a coordinated tax and fiscal policy that allows transfers to be made from one 
part of the union to another. If one state suffers a downturn while the other enjoys a 
boom, for example, then the second state can stimulate the economy of the first (or 
otherwise ameliorate the effects of the downturn) by making transfers to the 
citizens of the other state. More generally, if the states jointly tax the citizens of both 
states and implement a common welfare system, then a downturn in one state will 
automatically cause transfers from the booming state (whose citizens will pay 
higher taxes on their rising incomes) to the depressed state (whose unemployed 
citizens will receive transfers). But fiscal unification to this degree is possible only 
when the populations in both states agree to it, which may be difficult because 
people tend to believe that they are not responsible for the economic well-being of 
citizens of foreign states, or people in wealthier states fear that a common fiscal 
policy will result in transfers of their wealth to people in poorer states. 
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 On the basis of these considerations, many economists criticized European 
monetary integration back in the 1990s,91 and that criticism has proven to be 
perspicacious. The critics pointed out that European countries had very different 
economies and so would be likely to suffer different macroeconomic shocks; that 
labor (but not capital) mobility was low because of cultural barriers; and that the 
European Union (and the subset of Euro-zone states) lacked common fiscal 
institutions and hence could not easily make transfers across members. European 
policymakers apparently believed that these problems were either minimal or could 
be overcome through further integration, which would be stimulated in part by 
monetary integration. One idea, for example, was that a common currency would 
provide symbolic support for political integration, and thus help stimulate European 
solidarity, which could then provide the political basis for fiscal integration. But that 
has not happened. 
 
 The European experience can be compared with the “dollar-zone” 
established over a century ago in the United States, where one might also have 
worried that there was too much macroeconomic variation across states to justify a 
common currency. One difference between the United States and Europe, however, 
is that in the United States both capital and labor mobility is high because of a 
combination of constitutional guarantees and a common language and culture. 
Moreover, fiscal integration exists in the United States at the federal level. When a 
macroeconomic shock hits one region in the United States, the existing tax-and-
transfer system ensures that money flows from the other regions to the affected 
region. No similar institution exists in Europe.92 
 
 The current crisis in the Euro-zone began as a sovereign debt crisis, but the 
sovereign debt problem and monetary integration are closely related. The 
Maastricht Treaty required member states to satisfy certain macroeconomic 
standards—such as low inflation and low debt- and deficit-to-GDP ratios.93 It also 
included a no-bailout clause.94 The idea was apparently both to persuade creditors 
(and voters in wealthier countries) that more creditworthy countries like Germany 
would not have to bail out weaker countries like Greece, and to reduce the weakness 
of the weaker countries by compelling them to comply with sound macroeconomic 
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policies. Virtually all countries violated the macroeconomic standards from the 
beginning, however, including Germany and France. Greece borrowed vastly in 
excess of its capacity to repay. Creditors and bond rating agencies treated Greece as 
creditworthy nevertheless, possibly because they believed that Greece was not 
deviating too far from the standards and were fooled by Greece’s mendacious 
financial reporting, possibly because they assumed that Germany would bail out 
Greece if it defaulted, possibly because they believed that Greece’s economy would 
grow rapidly enough to absorb its growing debt obligations, or some combination of 
these possibilities. 
 
 When it became clear in the spring of 2010 that Greece would not be able to 
repay its debts, creditors refused to lend anymore except at interest rates that 
Greece could not afford. Other euro-zone members refused to bail out Greece.  As 
this became clear, the crisis spread to Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. The reasons 
for the weakness of these countries varied—in some of them, the government 
borrowed too much; in others, the banks borrowed too much and governments 
were on the hook for bank debt. In any event, it appeared that these countries too 
might default, and that they, like Greece, would not be bailed out, with the result 
that creditors demanded high interest rates for new debt. A further exacerbating 
factor is that many banks in these countries owned Greek debt; if Greece defaulted, 
then these banks might default, requiring bailouts from national governments, 
putting further pressure on their finances. Thus, a real fear of contagion arose, 
extending even to Germany and France.  Later in 2010, the euro-zone countries set 
up a European Financial Stability Facility with the authority to make loans to 
countries subject to the contagion, including Greece.95 Subsequent efforts in this 
vein have staved off financial collapse for the time being, although at this writing the 
situation is very much in flux. 
  
 The European sovereign debt crisis could have happened without monetary 
integration, but integration exacerbated it in three ways. First, as noted, creditors 
treated the peripheral countries as more creditworthy than they really were, 
possibly because they believed that other euro-zone countries would bail them out 
if they defaulted. This resulted in excessive borrowing by those countries. Second, 
governments of the core states apparently encouraged their national central banks 
to purchase the debt of peripheral states, creating an artificial subsidy for that debt. 
Third, precisely because the peripheral countries could not use monetary policy to 
stimulate their economies and avoid defaulting on their debt, the common currency 
put them in a more difficult economic position than they would otherwise faced. 
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 What will happen going forward? If optimum currency theory is taken 
seriously, then breakup of the Euro-zone seems to be the most likely outcome, with 
countries either returning to their original currencies or the creation of smaller 
currency unions (such as a “neuro” for northern countries).96 Breakup would be 
logistically difficult, however, as well as expensive, and—in the view of European 
leaders—politically disastrous. Thus, the question is whether Europeans will be 
willing to incur the cost of an inefficient currency union in order to maintain its 
political benefits. That question is difficult to answer. 
 
 Another possibility is institutional reform, so that the costs associated with a 
suboptimal currency union can be minimized. Two major reforms have been 
discussed. The first is a strengthening of macroeconomic constraints on member 
countries, so that the Greek experience will never be repeated. The problem with 
this approach is that the constraints must be enforced, and the usual sanction—
expulsion from the monetary union—is not credible because of the overriding 
desire to maintain the union. Indeed, the problem with the Maastricht Treaty was 
not that the macroeconomic criteria were too weak; the problem was that they were 
not enforced.97 Once again, the difficulty in fashioning a viable self-enforcement 
mechanism lies at the heart of the problem. 
 
 The second reform is further political integration. If European states could 
agree to fiscal union, so European citizens pay taxes to a European institution, which 
in turn makes transfers back to them, then fiscal policy could be used to offset some 
of the negative effects of monetary union when shocks are not common but hit 
particular states. The problem with this proposal is massive political resistance to 
fiscal union among voters in wealthy countries, who fear that the institution will 
simply transfer wealth from them to people in poor countries.98 
 
 The European experience provides an important lesson about the limits of 
international law. Macroeconomic policy creates externalities, and in theory 
countries can advance their self-interest by engaging in international cooperation. 
But uncertainty about optimal policy and the difficulty of implementing self-
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enforcement mechanisms in a volatile environment have undermined most efforts 
to cooperate. Until the European experiment, countries approached international 
monetary cooperation in a cautious spirit, in general adopting ad hoc arrangements 
that could quickly be abandoned. The European Monetary Union went to the 
opposite extreme by establishing a rigid treaty-based system that could not handle 
large adverse macroeconomic shocks and their political consequences. Once again, 
successful international cooperation on macroeconomic affairs has proven elusive. 
 
E. Floating Exchange Rates and “Currency Manipulation” (the China problem) 
 
 As noted, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, most major 
economies let their currencies float, while other economies pegged their currencies 
to (usually) their major trading partner. The system is governed by Article IV, 
section 1, of the IMF agreement: 
 
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system 
is to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and 
capital among countries, and that sustains sound economic growth, and that 
a principal objective is the continuing development of the orderly underlying 
conditions that are necessary for financial and economic stability, each 
member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to 
assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of 
exchange rates. In particular, each member shall: 
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective 
of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with 
due regard to its circumstances; 
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and 
financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce 
erratic disruptions; 
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system 
in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an 
unfair competitive advantage over other members; and 
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this 
Section. 99 
 
In practice, the IMF provides advice to countries about exchange rate policies 
(known as “surveillance”), encouraging them to obey these principles. But it has 
never adjudicated a country to be in violation of this article.  
 
 Still, it is worthwhile to ask what function the IMF might serve in addressing 
externalities from exchange rate policies in the post-Bretton Woods environment. 
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Two goals are identified: (1) maintaining “stability,” and (2) preventing 




 Exchange rate stability is, as we have seen, a value. A country that maintains 
exchange rate stability confers a benefit both on its citizens and on foreigners by 
reducing exchange rate risk. But exchange rate stability is only one value among 
many. Indeed, economists have observed that policymakers face a tradeoff between 
exchange rate stability, monetary policy autonomy, and freedom of financial flows, 
and can satisfy only two of these values at the same time.  If a country opts for 
exchange rate stability and freedom of financial flows, then (unless it is a very large 
country) its monetary policy will be determined in part by the choices of foreign 
states. If a country chooses monetary policy autonomy and freedom of financial 
flows, then it must permit its exchange rate to float.100 
 
 The problem for the IMF is that monetary policy autonomy and freedom of 
financial flows are just as important for the economic well-being of a country as 
exchange rate stability is. Indeed, they may be more important. If states want to 
attract foreign investment, then they must allow capital to move across their 
borders. If states want to use monetary policy to counter economic downturns, then 
they need control over monetary policy. The optimal mix of these instruments 
surely varies from state to state. 
 
 Accordingly, any simple rule requiring states to maintain a “stable” exchange 
rate is likely to be unacceptable because in many cases it would require states to 
forego policies that they deem important—that was a core problem with fixed 
exchange rates as we have seen. Despite the goal of “stability,” states in fact desire to 
retain considerable flexibility. But how is such flexibility to be governed so as to 
avoid substantial externalities? A rule that required states to choose the “optimal” 
mix of policy instruments would clearly be unworkable; it would require so many 
state contingent elements that it would be impossible to craft. No one really knows 
what the optimal mix of policy instruments is, and those who think they know will 
find large numbers of people who disagree. For this reason, the IMF goal of 
“stability” is difficult to implement as a legal matter, just as the effort to maintain 
fixed exchange rates during the Bretton Woods years ultimately proved a failure. 
IMF staff can jawbone national governments about stability as part of the 
surveillance process, and will no doubt continue to do so, but because clear rules 
                                                        
100 See Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 509-10 (describing the policy “trilemma”). 
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about what is required cannot be devised, national authorities will retain the 
discretion to promote the degree of “stability” that they believe serves the national 




 The goal of avoiding “manipulation” is focused on trade policy. Under IMF 
Article IV, members are obliged not to intervene in exchange markets for the 
purpose of securing an “unfair competitive advantage” in international trade. The 
fear is that a nation may artificially depress its exchange rate in order to make its 
exports cheaper and imports more expensive.  
 
 In recent years, accusations of manipulation have focused particularly on 
China. For many years, China has maintained a rough peg between its currency 
(RMB) and the dollar. To prevent the RMB from appreciating, it has intervened by 
selling RMB and buying dollars, to the point that it has now accumulated over $2 
trillion in foreign exchange reserves. Over the same period China has often run trade 
surpluses with major trading partners, particularly the United States and Europe.102 
 
 From an economic standpoint, the rule against “manipulation” may be 
questioned, as its effects on other nations are at best unclear. In the long run, 
exchange rate devaluations will have no “real” effect on economic activity because 
other prices will adjust to offset—a consequence of what economists terms the long-
run neutrality of money. By analogy, if the United States government were to fiat 
that every dollar suddenly becomes two dollars, the eventual equilibrium would 
involve all prices in dollars doubling, so that in real terms nothing had changed. In 
the short run, things are more complicated but still subtle. For example, if goods are 
priced in the currency of the country in which they are manufactured, and an 
unanticipated reduction in the value of that currency occurs, then exports become 
cheaper in foreign currency and imports become more expensive in domestic 
currency. This phenomenon raises the national income of trading partners (in 
economic parlance, their “terms of trade” improve because what they sell becomes 
more expensive and what they buy becomes cheaper), while reducing the exporting 
country’s national income (for the opposite reason). It is not obvious why trading 
partners should complain about policies that increase their national incomes.103 
 
                                                        
101 This section draws heavily on Staiger & Sykes, supra note __. 
102 See id. 
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 Nevertheless, such short run effects may beget adverse political reactions 
abroad from exporting firms and import-competing firms. Such political 
considerations perhaps explain the genesis of IMF Article IV. Likewise, Article XV of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides that members shall not “by 
exchange action frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement.”104 These 
provisions plainly evidence a concern that currency practices may undermine 
certain rules of the international trading system, including limits on tariffs and 
export subsidies. 
 
 Despite the extensive intervention by many countries into exchange markets 
through the years, however, no country has been adjudicated to be in violation of 
either the IMF prohibition on manipulation or the GATT prohibition on measures 
that frustrate its intent. It also seems unlikely that any country will be found to have 
violated these rules in the future. It is instructive to ask why. The answer, as one of 
us has argued in another paper coauthored with Robert Staiger,105 is that clear rules 
to distinguish manipulation from other, acceptable forms of exchange market 
intervention are simply too difficult to fashion.106 
 
 Under IMF law, before a member may be found to have engaged in illegal 
currency manipulation to affect the balance of trade, it must have deliberately 
affected the exchange rate to a degree sufficient to cause “fundamental 
misalignment,” and must have done so for the “purpose” of increasing net exports. 
Regarding the purpose of its policies, members’ representations are given “the 
benefit of any reasonable doubt.”107   
 
 Putting aside the “misalignment” concept which need not detain us here, it is 
exceedingly difficult to divine the “purpose” behind government policies. To take the 
example of China, Chinese officials deny that they are manipulating the exchange 
rate to increase net exports. Alternative accounts of their motivations, entitled to the 
“benefit of any reasonable doubt” as noted above, are supported by the work of 
some prominent academics. Ronald McKinnon, a well-known monetary economist, 
for example, has argued that China’s policies have controlled inflation within the 
Chinese economy effectively and stimulated economic growth.108 This argument 
may well satisfy the “reasonable doubt” standard that the IMF itself embraces.109 
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106 For a related discussion on the difficulty of regulation, see Claus D. Zimmerman, Exchange Rate 
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 The core problem here again lies in the impossibility of crafting a legal rule 
that turns on verifiable information. Nations engage in monetary policies, including 
exchange market intervention, for a host of reasons, many considered benign and a 
proper exercise of national sovereignty. To protect the ability of IMF members to 
pursue such policies, the IMF seeks to sort cases based on the intent of the monetary 
authorities. But intent is not ascertainable as a legal matter, and the rules 
accordingly have no real force.     
 
 If the IMF offers little hope in this area, what about the WTO? GATT Article 
XV(4) states that members “shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the 
provisions of this Agreement.”110 Nothing in Article XV or elsewhere in GATT 
provides guidance, however, as to what sorts of exchange practices would be 
acceptable. Likewise, Article XV(4) has never been interpreted by the WTO/GATT 
dispute system, and no case law exists on the question of what exchange practices 
would violate the GATT.    
 
 A policy that runs throughout Article XV, however, is deference to IMF rules. 
For example, Article XV(9) states that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall preclude ... 
the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange restrictions in 
accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.” A 
threshold question, therefore, is whether an “exchange action” can frustrate the 
intent of GATT if it is not a violation of IMF law. This question is critical in light the 
fact that the IMF would have great difficulty adjudicating China's policies to be 
"currency manipulation" for reasons given above, and because the WTO would 
almost certainly defer to the IMF on this issue if it is deemed legally relevant. 
 
 But perhaps a violation of GATT Article XV(4)does not, as a legal matter, 
require a violation of IMF law. Can the WTO plausibly adjudicate a violation of 
Article XV(4) without IMF support? Nations undertake macroeconomic policies all 
the time that have the potential to influence trade (including, historically, some 
dramatic currency devaluations). Current U.S. monetary policy, for example, has 
lowered interest rates and placed downward pressure on the dollar to a degree that 
may well have had significant trade impact. Such general macroeconomic policies 
have never even been challenged, let alone condemned, in the WTO/GATT system. If 
the WTO dispute process were now to rule that certain macroeconomic policies 
affecting trade are illegal, it would open a Pandora's box with enormous potential 
for political strife and tension within the system.  It thus seems unlikely that the 
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WTO would find a violation of Article XV(4) in an exchange practice that was 
permissible under the applicable law of the IMF.     
 
 Thus, the WTO suffers the same essential problem as the IMF when it 
confronts allegations that exchange measures “frustrate the intent” of GATT. It is 
exceedingly difficult to distinguish legitimate monetary policies from inappropriate 
ones. The vagueness of the standard under GATT Article XV(4), and the fact that it 
has never been the subject of adjudication in the now 65 year history of the GATT 
system, reflects the difficult and perhaps insurmountable challenges of devising any 
sort of clear principle for identifying problematic practices.  
 
V. A Regime Not (or Barely) Tried: Macroeconomic Stimulus Cooperation 
 
 Countries that pursue monetary policy that maximizes their national interest 
will, under plausible assumptions, choose monetary actions that harm (or benefit) 
other countries.111 Cooperation may mitigate this problem, but, as we will see, 
international cooperation with respect to monetary policy is extremely difficult. 
 
 Although economists disagree a great deal about optimal monetary policy, 
there is not much doubt that monetary policy can produce inflation or deflation. 
When a central bank prints money, more money chases a constant supply of goods 
and services, and so the value of money relative to those goods and services 
declines. Conversely, deflation takes place if the central bank withdraws enough 
money from the economy.112 
 
 If economists generally agree that central banks can influence the money 
supply and hence the price level, they agree much less on whether central banks can 
do so in a manner that effectively advances social goals. The most common position, 
and one that is reflected in the policies of most central banks, is that central banks 
can smooth out the business cycle by pursuing countercyclical monetary policy. 
Simplifying greatly, the theory is as follows. During economic recessions, people are 
afraid to spend money, because they do not know whether they will be employed for 
long; and businesses are reluctant to invest money, because they do not think that 
people will buy their goods. As a result businesses fire employees, who then are 
unable to buy goods, which further reduces demand, in a downward spiral. The 
central bank can help end a recession by increasing the money supply. The reason is 
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that as money becomes more plentiful, the cost of borrowing money will decline,113 
so businesses will be more willing to borrow money in order invest. That means 
that they will hire workers, who will then have enough money to buy things; the 
workers will also be more willing to borrow in order to buy things, which will also 
results in businesses having more money to invest. In short, by reducing the cost of 
credit or money, the central bank increases aggregate demand, which creates more 
economic activity. 
 
 Once good times return, however, the central bank must put on the brakes, 
and reduce (or stop increasing) the money supply. Once the economy reaches full 
capacity, easy credit will not result in the hiring of additional workers or the buying 
of additional goods and services. Instead, the ratio of money to the value of goods 
and services increases, producing inflation. Inflation generally interferes with 
economic activity by making prices unpredictable, thereby creating risk, and by 
harming actors who are not effectively hedged against it.114 A central bank reduces 
the money supply to limit inflation. 
 
 The efficacy of such countercyclical policies has been somewhat 
controversial through the years. Early “rational expectations” critiques suggested 
that economic actors would anticipate the inflationary effects of any increase in the 
money supply, so that wages and prices would increase and monetary stimulus 
would have no real effects (again, the long run neutrality of money scenario).115 
Other economists responded that price flexibility is limited, in some cases due to 
contracts that lock in existing prices, so that monetary policy can have real effects in 
the short term.116 That view currently predominates, and the current tendency 
among most important central banks, as far as we know, is to pursue countercyclical 
monetary policy. Nonetheless, what is good for a particular country is not 
necessarily good for all countries, as we will now show. 
 
 To illustrate, assume that a central bank can affect price levels by controlling 
the money supply. Imagine that two countries face an economic downturn, and 
believe that it is in their interest to expand the money supply—that is, they conclude 
that the benefit in the form of increased employment exceeds the cost of possible 
future inflation. The two countries are Home and Foreign, and each can choose two 
                                                        
113 Id. at 362. 
114 See Blanchard & Fischer, supra note _, at 568-69. 
115 Id. at 573-75. 
116 E.g., John B. Taylor, Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts, 88 J. POL. ECON, 1 (1980); Stanley 
Fischer, Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations and the Optimal Money Supply Rule, 85 J. POL. 
ECON. 191 (1977). 
43 
monetary policies—“somewhat expansionary” and “very expansionary.”117 An 
expansionary monetary policy reduces Home’s unemployment rate, while creating a 
risk of inflation. The policy might also influence economic outcomes in Foreign—but 
the effect could be complex. One potential effect is that stimulus in Home will 
increase demand in Home for Foreign’s products, thus benefiting Foreign’s 
economy. Another potential effect is that stimulus in Home will, by causing inflation 
in Home, cause Foreign’s currency to increase in value relative to Home’s currency. 
This could hurt Foreign’s export sector and—indirectly, by causing unemployment 
in that sector and thus potentially a decline of aggregate demand—the entire 
economy. It could also cause asset bubbles in Foreign. As interest rates fall in Home, 
investors will shift their investments to Foreign, bidding up asset prices in a manner 
that may not be sustainable over time. 
 
 Let us thus assume that when Home chooses a somewhat expansionary 
policy, it benefits Foreign, and when it chooses a very expansionary policy, it harms 
Foreign. The same is true in the opposite direction. Thus, the optimal outcome for 
both countries is reached when both countries choose the somewhat expansionary 
monetary policy. It may be in Home’s interest, however, to switch from a somewhat 
to very expansionary monetary policy because, for Home, the gains (in terms of 
further reduction in unemployment) exceed the losses (inflation), while Home has 
no incentive to take into account the costs for Foreign. Foreign has the same 
incentives, and thus in the absence of cooperation, both Home and Foreign may 
choose the suboptimal very expansionary monetary policy. 
 
 Can Home and Foreign cooperate in order to avoid the jointly inferior 
outcome? There are two major problems. The first is the fundamental policy 
uncertainty—both at the level of theory and in terms of practical application. 
Economists cannot agree on monetary policy, and even if they could, there is even 
less agreement in particular contexts as to how the central bank should affect the 
money supply. Thus, countries may refuse to cooperate simply because they 
disagree about what should be done.  
 
 A second problem is the familiar difficulty of creating a self-enforcing 
agreement. Even if states can agree that (in our example) “somewhat expansionary 
monetary policy” is jointly optimal, while “very expansionary monetary policy” is 
not jointly optimal, they may not be able to reach a self-enforcing agreement that 
limits them to optimal actions. The reason is that retaliation may involve actions 
                                                        
117 Cf. the model Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, supra note _, at 554-56, which considers the opposite 
policy scenario—that countries choose among restrictive monetary policies to combat inflation. 
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that are costly to the retaliator and not credible. In our example, suppose that 
Foreign is surprised by Home’s very expansionary monetary policy, and that its only 
retaliatory option is to engage in the same policy next period. By that time, however, 
economic circumstances may have changed and an expansionary policy may no 
longer be in its self-interest. 
 
 Going beyond our example, the two-country assumption masks an enormous 
amount of real-world complexity. Monetary policies no doubt have important 
externalities, but they run in many directions among the important economies of the 
world – Europe, the United States, Japan, China, and so on. The task of orchestrating 
useful cooperation in this setting – where central banks face a divergence of 
circumstances and a divergence of views on optimal policies, is truly daunting. 
 
 As a consequence, about the most one can expect is occasional ad hoc 
cooperation among a subset of central banks confronting an immediate short-term 
problem.118 Central banks famously were unable to cooperate in response to the 
Great Depression, when at least in theory they might have agreed to pump liquidity 
into the international financial system, but distrust in a hostile international 
environment and disagreement about policy undermined negotiations.119 In 
subsequent years, efforts at cooperation centered around management of exchange 
rates rather than coordinated responses to global downturns. Possibly the most 
successful examples of cooperation among national financial authorities were the 
responses to sovereign debt crises in Mexico in 1994-1995, and Asia in 1997-1998, 
where western countries launched rescues through the IMF.120 After the September 
11, 2001 attack, the Fed opened foreign exchange swap lines with a number of 
foreign central banks, which enabled those banks to borrow U.S. currency from the 
Fed, and then relend this money to banks located in their jurisdiction that provided 
loans in U.S. currency.121 But this approach, which may have prevented a global 
downturn through injection of liquidity internationally, was essentially a unilateral 
move. Foreign central banks accepted the loans so that they could support local 
banks that took deposits in U.S. dollars, not as a part of a coordinated response to 
international macroeconomic conditions. Over the next several years, under the 
auspices of the G20 and the IMF, countries attempted to address global economic 
“imbalances” (chiefly, the worry that U.S. current account deficit would eventually 
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result in a sharp devaluation of the dollar, causing a global recession) but made little 
progress.122 
 
 The financial crisis that began in 2007 posed a considerable challenge to 
central bank cooperation.123 The central bank response began as early as November 
of that year, when G-20 ministers announced that that central bank governors 
recognized the global downturn and would cooperate in addressing it; subsequently 
the central banks of the top developing countries announced that they would jointly 
pump liquidity into their national economies.124 The Fed opened foreign exchange 
swap lines with foreign central banks, so as to ensure that U.S. currency would be 
available for foreign loans. The European and Swiss central banks, and other central 
banks, did so as well for their own currencies.125 Subsequently, the central banks 
coordinated in cutting interest rates.126 However, countries failed to coordinate 
their fiscal policies; some commentators argue that the Fed loosened monetary 
policy without taking into account the negative effects on other countries; and 
“there is no disputing that the inability at the Seoul G20 summit in November 2010 
to agree on what constituted mutually-beneficial adjustments in monetary and fiscal 
policies left potential gains from policy coordination on the table.”127 
 
 The success of the swap operations was probably due to the very narrow 
form of cooperation they entailed: a loan from one central bank to another, where 
the Fed gains from the injection of liquidity, and the recipient gains through the 
support for its local banks. There is no short-term cost from this type of 
cooperation, and virtually no credit risk.128 The broader and more controversial 
forms of cooperation involving coordinated monetary and fiscal policies had much 




 We have discussed four areas of international economic cooperation: (1) 
trade; (2) banking regulation; (3) exchange rate regulation; and (4) monetary 
stimulus cooperation. We have measured cooperation in two ways: the extent to 
which cooperation has been institutionalized in international rules, international 
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agencies, and domestic law; and the extent to which cooperation has had positive 
economic outcomes. Trade cooperation can be counted a success: it has been heavily 
institutionalized and it seems to have contributed to the growth of international 
trade. Banking regulation can be counted a partial success. Banking regulation is not 
heavily institutionalized at the international level, but the Basel rules have been 
incorporated into domestic law and probably have contributed to international 
financial stability in good times but could not prevent financial disaster. Exchange 
rate regulation has largely failed: it was institutionalized during the Bretton Woods 
era but subject to a great deal of ad hoc adjustment, and had limited impact on 
international exchange rates, which were later allowed to float. Finally, central 
banks have largely failed to coordinate efforts to stimulate economies during 
downturns, and national governments have not even attempted fiscal cooperation, 
with very limited exceptions. 
 
 What accounts for this pattern? With such a small number of data points, one 
can only speculate, but we will hazard the following explanation. First, cooperation 
becomes possible as the expected gain from cooperation increases. This point may 
seem too obvious to be worth making, but international macroeconomic 
cooperation illustrates a twist, emphasizing the word “expected.” The expected gain 
from cooperation is a function partly of policy uncertainty. When optimal policy is 
uncertain, the gains must be discounted; in addition, there is option value in playing 
wait-and-see, or taking modest rather than aggressive measures. The benefits, costs, 
and risks of international trade have been largely understood by economists since 
the early nineteenth century. Thus, the gains from international trade cooperation 
could be easily predicted. By contrast, economists disagree a great deal more about 
exchange rate policy, banking regulation, and stimulus; the empirical effects of these 
actions are harder to predict. 
 
 Second, cooperation becomes possible at an international level when the 
behavior of interest is susceptible to rule-based regulation. Because cooperation is 
possible only when countries can monitor each other and retaliate in response to 
violations, and monitoring is very difficult at the international level, it is necessary 
for violations to be clearly defined, which is possible only if clear rules distinguish 
permissible and forbidden behavior. It turns out that some forms of cooperative 
behavior can be more easily governed by rules than other forms can. 
 
 Consider first international trade. For certain types of behavior, violations 
can be easily defined and punished. If states agree that the tariff on certain goods 
will be no greater than X, then violation occurs when the tariff is higher than X. 
Because the exporter must pay the tariff, its existence cannot be disputed. There are 
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harder cases, to be sure. Whether a pollution control law is an impermissible trade 
barrier or a legitimate method for reducing pollution can turn on complex 
evidentiary questions, but the analytic inquiry is relatively straightforward. And 
even if this area of trade law can be subject to abuse, the reduction of tariff barriers 
is a clear example of success. International law in this way enables states to obtain 
some cooperative benefits even if a portion of the theoretically possible cooperative 
surplus lies beyond their reach. 
 
 Banking regulation provides an instructive comparison. The Basel I system 
created a system of crude rules that could be mechanically applied. It established a 
minimum ratio of capital to assets. It required banks to calculate their assets by 
placing them into one of four risk-weighted baskets and multiplying their value by 0, 
0.2, 0.5, or 1, depending on the level of risk. Off-balance sheet items were subject to 
a similar risk conversion process. Capital was carefully defined, and then mechanical 
rules were used to determine the extent to which different types of capital (common 
equity, different types of preferred such as cumulative and noncumulative, 
subordinated debt, and so forth) could be used for the numerator of the capital 
adequacy ratio. Thus, banking agencies in different countries using this method 
would likely obtain very similar results. 
 
 But the algorithm was too crude. A loan to a highly creditworthy municipality 
and a loan to a less creditworthy municipality received the same weight because all 
loans to municipalities were put in the same basket. A bank with good management 
was treated the same as a bank with bad management. A bank that reduced its risk 
exposure by buying derivatives would receive no credit.129 The Basel Committee 
responded with the significantly more complex Basel II rules. Basel II permits banks 
to use their own models to calculate the risk of default; regulators may approve or 
reject those models but it is not clear that other countries can evaluate the 
regulators’ decisions. Basel II also requires regulators to evaluate banks’ market risk 
and operational risk in addition to credit risk—and not only that but also systemic 
risk, reputational risk, pension risk, strategic risk, and many other types of risk. 
Under Basel I, the analysis of a bank could produce a single number—the leverage 
ratio—that could be compared to a simple rule—the leverage limit. Under Basel II, 
the analysis of a bank produces all kinds of numbers reflecting different types of 
risks, and no clear way to aggregate them. The additional complexity unavoidably 
requires regulators to rely more on judgment, which makes cross-country 
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monitoring more difficult. Basel III, created in response to the failure of Basel II to 
prevent the financial crisis, is even more complex. 
 
 In this case, reliance on simple rules turns out to be impossible: they result in 
banks being either excessively risky or excessively constrained. But under the more 
complex system, it may be too difficult for countries to determine whether the 
regulators of other countries are complying or not. However, it is too soon to tell 
whether Basel III will succeed or fail. 
 
 Exchange rate risk provides another setting. One might believe that 
management of exchange rate would be similar to management of trade. In both 
cases, countries must make a tradeoff and embody it in a system of rules. In the case 
of trade, countries trade off the interests of exporters and import-competing firms 
(and possibly consumers) and agree to tariffs and trade barriers that are mutually 
beneficial. Once these rules are in place, states monitor each other for compliance.  
 
 Then why has exchange rate cooperation been so difficult? A key reason is 
that exchange rates are in fact rather difficult to govern through rule-based 
regulation. Any agreement on specific exchange rates quickly becomes outdated as 
macroeconomic shocks lead some nations to run short on reserves and wish to 
devalue. A system is necessary that permits states to change exchange rates to 
respond to these shocks while prohibiting them from doing so for “manipulative” 
reasons—for example, to stimulate exports at the expense of other states. But no 
mechanical formula for distinguishing valid and invalid exchange rate policy has 
been discovered, and so distinguishing violations is very difficult.130 Likewise, under 
Bretton Woods, the IMF was given supervisory authority, but little enforcement 
power, no doubt because countries could not commit themselves to trusting an 
agency with discretionary authority. 
 
 Finally, cooperation must be self-enforcing. Nations must have a credible 
threat to retaliate against cheating that is sufficient to discourage cheating in the 
first place, at least under ordinary circumstances. In international trade, self-
enforcement works because the threat to withdraw prior trade concessions in 
response to cheating is perfectly credible, at least for large countries. Political 
officials can benefit from such retaliation and show no reluctance to use it when it is 
authorized. In the other systems we have studied, however, retaliatory threats are 
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inadequate to sustain cooperation in many scenarios. If banking regulators in 
country A are unwilling to liquidate failing banks in a crisis, for example, the 
prospect that foreign regulators may behave similarly can be insufficient to change 
their minds – here, due to shocks, nations are better off by deviating and seeing 
cooperation unravel than they are by complying. The same problem afflicts 
exchange rate cooperation when a nation comes under intense pressure to devalue. 
 
 Put differently, shocks to the international trade system historically tend to 
be small and sufficiently industry specific that no member can benefit by opting out 
of cooperation altogether. Even when the temptation to deviate on a particular issue 
arises, the value of cooperation on many other issues remains and participation in 
the system is stable.  
 
 Cooperation in the trade area also benefits from the fact that retaliation can 
be targeted directly at the violator. If Europe cheats on a commitment to the United 
States, the United States can respond with a discriminatory tariff on important 
European exports to the United States. If Japan cheats on an exchange rate 
commitment by devaluing the yen, by contrast, the United States could respond with 
measures to devalue the dollar, but those measures would affect many other nations 
(and currencies). Only a coordinated response involving all major currencies other 
than the yen can move the world toward the status quo ante, but such coordinated 
responses may be much more difficult to orchestrate. Similar problems can arise 




 Our paper might seem excessively pessimistic, but that would be a 
misinterpretation of it. If it had been written in 1940, it would have been regarded 
as excessively optimistic. We suspect that from 1945 to the present, countries have 
exploited all or nearly all the gains from international macroeconomic cooperation 
that are possible under the sort of rules-based system that can be the subject of 
international law. Particularly from 1990 to 2001, international conditions were 
about as favorable as they have ever been for international cooperation in general, 
so it is predictable that countries would have exploited whatever gains were 
available. Further gains can be obtained only through the merger of states, so that 
central banks and other financial regulators could exercise discretionary authority 
over a larger population. That is what the Europeans tried, with mixed results, 
probably because the European economies are not sufficiently integrated and 
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